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May, 1972
The assumptions upon which the economic, military, political and
psychological consequences of a U.S. unilateral troop reduction from
Europe were based in this study may prove to be unfounded should a true
rapprochement emerge as a result of recent international developments:
the Chinese-Soviet summits conducted by President Nixon, the ratification
of Chancellor Brandt's West German-Soviet treaty, and the newly signed
Berlin accord. As with any international treaty or agreement, however,
time becomes the true determinant whether it will succeed or fail. Until
a witnessed relaxation of tensions occurs throughout the world, it is
felt that any precipitate movement on the part of the United States with
regard to troop reductions from Western Europe could well lead to the
type of repercussions presented in this study.
January, 1973
Although the research and factual material presented in this essay
was prepared in late 1971 and early 1972, it is felt the conclusions
remain viable and pertinent. The numerous developments in international
affairs which occurred in late 1972 and early 1973 no doubt would temper
the projections offered by this analysis, however, time, as previously
stated, remains the true determinant of success or failure. These develop-
ments therefore serve merely as additional inputs into our judgment and
evaluation processes. It remains my opinion that any precipitate US
action with regards to its NATO commitment could well lead to those "types
of repercussions discussed in this essay.
D. J. DEWAR JR.

In this age of negotiation and reevaluation, there has been con-
siderable political debate in the United States Congress concerning the
reduction of the American military influence throughout the world. As
the American people have become more and more disenchanted with the
military entanglement in Southeast Asia, greater support has been rendered
for the argument that the United States badly needs to reevaluate its
foreign policy objectives, hence its military commitments. It is the aim
of this study to analyze the possible implications and/or consequences of
a United States unilateral troop reduction from Western Europe, more
specifically, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
As an introduction into the study, it would be well to briefly review
a few international developments and to observe how the current Soviet
threat is perceived. Since its inception in 1949, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization has been successful in safeguarding the security of
the North Atlantic area. . Sustained peace, prevailing in Europe for more
than a quarter of a century, has established such a high level of security
that some Americans, and Europeans, feel that the threat of a Soviet bloc
attack upon Western Europe is extremely improbable. To those proponents of
US military reductions, it is accordingly unnecessary for the United States
to continue to maintain the degree of military commitment it has maintained
to Europe in the past. Senator Mansfield, long a proponent of US troop
reductions, claims that an American withdrawal might additionally provide
the impetus the Western Europeans need to develop their own defense -
capabilities in line with their respective needs. A careful consideration
of this argument need be made—after all, Czechoslovakia—1968, is surely
not ancient history. The Czechoslovakian invasion, in addition to clearly

indicating to the world that the Soviet Union had not relinquished its
use of armed force in achieving its political objectives, questioned
Western Europe's vulnerability to a conventional attack from the East.
In the past several years., partly due to its involvement in Middle
East affairs, the Soviet Union has established a strong military presence
in the Mediterranean. In addition to the NATO naval forces operating in
the Mediterranean, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, all NATO allies, have become
aware of the strength of the Soviet fleet. Its expansion, combined with
the continuing reduction of US naval strength, has transformed the
Mediterranean from what was once referred to as a "NATO lake" into a sea
of superpower rivalry.
The recent increases in strength and numbers of the Warsaw Pact
forces also gives credence to the belief that the communist threat still
exists. It might perhaps be interpreted differently than it was in 1945,
but the present threat is none-the-less still very real.
In 1968 at Reykjavik, Iceland, the Foreign Ministers of NATO agreed
to maintain the existing level of forces in the Alliance while at the same
time recognizing the need for some type of balance in the military forces
of the two blocs. In October of 1969, the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw
Pact nations met in Prague to discuss the possibilities of an all-European
security conference. No mention was made of the United States or Canada
in these discussions, however, little doubt existed that either would be
2
excluded from the proposed conference. Since 1969, the North Atlantic
"Key Area Where U.S. is Slipping: Meaning of Russian Gains in
Mediterranean," U.S. News and World Report , March 20, 1972, pp. 38-41.
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U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe,
Report of Special Study Mission to Europe by Hon. Leonard Farbstein, New
York, Chairman Sub-committee on Europe
, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., March
29, 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 2-3.

Council has also conducted studies on the questions of 'force reductions.
NATO has been trying unsuccessfully to obtain an invitation to Moscow for
its former secretary-general, Manlio Brosio, who was supposed to represent
the Western allies in preliminary discussions on troop reductions. The
Soviets have persistently avoided inviting Brosio to Moscow and have
3blatently ignored and sidestepped the NATO overtures.
In light of these international developments, the question then be-
comes: Is it wise at this time for the United States to substantially
reduce its military commitment to NATO and to the Western European defense
structure?
At this time it is felt that a pertinent, and often overlooked, question
should be discussed: What is meant by the term "substantial" when referring
to proposed US military reductions?
Several definitions could be given, however, it is significant to
acknowledge the goal desired by reducing the troop levels. As numerous
goals can be formulated, each requiring varying amounts of troop reductions,
for the sake of summarization, they shall be divided into three broad
categories. They are not however, meant to be rigid or exclusive.
The first might be an outright reduction of at least 150,000 troops
now stationed in Europe. By demobilizing them upon their return to the
United States, overall US defense appropriations and foreign exchange ex-
penditures would be significantly reduced. "Substantial" with this goal
in mind would be at least 150,000 troops.
A second proposal, aimed solely at domestic US budgetary expenditures,
might be to leave the troops which are stationed in Europe at approximately
3




the same level while demobilizing those forces which are stationed in the
United States and ear-marked for NATO's use. "Substantial" in this in-
stance would be defined in terms of reserve forces committed for NATO's
useage. Due to the conflict in Southeast Asia', many of these reserve
forces have been transferred outside of the United States. The specific
number remaining in the US and ear-marked for NATO is therefore difficult
to calculate. Once the US extricates itself from Southeast Asia however,
the numbers of forces reserved for NATO will be considerably more than
those currently stationed in Europe.
The third broad proposal might be the reduction of 50,000 to 75,000
troops currently stationed in Europe. Reductions would be conducted on a
highly selective basis so as not to impair the combat capability of the
remaining troops. Reductions could be accomplished by minimizing the non-
combatant troops; relocating headquarter facilities, or entirely eliminating
them; turning over US military support jobs to local nationals; in short,
eliminating the duplication of effort, time, and money. This proposal pre-
sents the advantage of reducing both the United States exchange deficits and
the domestic budgetary expenditures without severely jeopardizing any
US combat capability. "Substantial" in this instance would be between
50,000 and 75,000 troops.
Senator Mansfield, concerned about both the total US budgetary expenses
and the foreign exchange deficits, gave his own definition of "substantial"
in his proposed amendment to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.
He stated 150,000 troops were sufficient to honor the United States troop
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commitment to NATO. As roughly 300,000 US troops are 'presently stationed
in Europe, "substantial" for the senator is 150,000 men.
It is apparent then, that no definite figure can be, or has been,
agreed upon as to the precise number of troops, involved in "substantial"
reductions. For purposes of this study, 150,000 men, or approximately
one-half of the present US commitment, shall be considered "substantial."
Although many important and difficult issues exist in any reassessment
process, an attempt will be made to analyze those questions considered
basic to US-European relations:
What effect would a substantial US unilateral troop reduction have
upon East-West relations in general? Would it disrupt the current European
economic status quo? Would it impel NATO allies in Europe to increase
their military contributions to the Alliance? Would a reduction substantially
ease the dollar drain from the US balance-of-payments deficit? What effect
would it have on American credibility throughout Europe? . . . the world?
What impact would a US troop withdrawal have upon the overall security of
Europe? Would it disrupt the present military balance-of-power in favor of
the East? Would a vacuum be created in the European defense structure?
Would it politically fragment Western Europe? Would it strengthen or weaken
NATO's posture and the opportunities for detente? Would US leadership in
the Alliance be seriously questioned? Would a reduction strengthen the
4
U.S., Congress, Congressional Record , "Text of the Mansfield Amendment
(No. 86)," 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1970), CXVII, No. 68, p. S6679. In
Section 401(b) of his proposed amendment, Senator Mansfield proposed that
"no funds appropriated by Congress may be used after December 31, 1971,
for the purpose of supporting or maintaining in Europe any military per-
sonnel of the U.S. in excess of 150,000." See Appendix I.

currently emerging fears that the US is adopting a new ' isolationist
foreign policy doctrine? Would it appear that the current NATO strategy
is being altered back to its former one of "massive retaliation?" Would
significant reorientations in both European and US policies take place?
Would NATO allies in Europe seek to ease relations with the Soviet bloc
nations? What problems would result as a readjustment occurred? Infla-
tion? Unemployment? Would it appear as if the US Congress was dictating
American foreign policy? Would it accomplish what the present Administra-
tion is seeking in its new low profile approach to foreign policy? What
economic repercussions might be experienced between Europe and the United
States?
These are some of the more searching questions which need to be con-
sidered in any decision concerning substantial US force reductions. As a
prelude to their discussion, however , several related topics need to be
analyzed. 3ecause foremost in a foreign policy decision of this magnitude
is the mood, attitude, and/or feeling of the United States Administration,
a brief analysis of President Nixon's attitude toward US commitments in
Europe is offered. An additional factor which should be established is the
degree to which the United States is presently involved in NATO. Specific
numbers on US troop and defense expenditures are accordingly outlined. A
concluding section is concerned with the military balance that exists be-
tween the NATO allies and the Warsaw Pact nations.

PRESENT ADMINISTRATION POLICY TOWARD
U.S. FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE
Although there have been slight but steady reductions in the number
of troops stationed in Europe over the past several years (in 1966 there
were still close to 400,000 men stationed in Europe as a result of the
build-up during the Berlin crisis of 1961-1962) , the present Administra-
tion does not appear to be planning substantial withdrawals from Europe
in the immediate years to come. On several occasions President Nixon
has expressed both his belief in NATO and his commitment to maintain
approximately the same force levels in Europe. In a post-inauguration
speech in January of 1969, he told the North Atlantic Council:
In creating new policy making machinery in Washington, one
of my principal aims has been to shift the focus of American
policy from crisis management to crisis prevention. That is
one of the reasons why I value NATO so highly. NATO was
established as a preventative force; and NATO can be credited
with the fact that, while Europe has endured its share of
crises in the past twenty years, the ultimate crisis that
would have provoked a nuclear war has been prevented. Those
nations that were free twenty years ago are still free today.
Thus, in its original purpose, NATO has been a resounding
success: Europe and America have proved that the dream of
collective security can be made a reality.
5
In April of the same year, he once again addressed the Council. On that
occasion he reemphasized the US support for NATO.
NATO is needed; and the American commitment to NATO
will remain in force and remain strong. We in
America continue to consider Europe's security as
our own."
"President Nixon's Remarks to the North Atlantic Council: February 24,
1969," Department of State Bulletin , 60:250-252 (March 24, 1969).
Richard M. Nixon, "NATO: The Need for Unity," Vital Speeches of the
Day, XXXV, No. 14 (May 1, 1969).
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During his trip to Western Europe and the Mediterranean in the fall
of 1970, President Nixon spoke to reporters in Ireland in the following
terms:
Considerable concern, I find, has arisen among many of the
NATO nations, the major nations and the smaller NATO nations,
as a result of some comments by political figures in the
United States as well as some of those commenting upon the
American role in the world, that the United States might
not meet its NATO responsibilities and was on the verge of
reducing its contribution to NATO. I stated categorically
to the NATO commanders, and I do here publicly again, that
the United States will, under no circumstances, reduce,
unilaterally, its commitment to NATO. Any reduction in
NATO forces, if it occurs, will only take place on a multi-
lateral basis and on the basis of what those who are lined
up against the NATO forces—what they might do. In other
words, it would have to be on a mutual basis.'
In an article printed in the November 9, 1970, edition of the New
York Times
,
political editor William Beecher stated that Defense Secretary
Laird personally favored pulling out 20,000 to 40,000 supply troops from
Europe at an estimated annual saving of $200 to $300 million. According
to Beecher, State Department officials opposed the move because it would
undermine Allied confidence in the United States' determination to keep
its NATO commitment. He also reported that President Nixon opposed the
idea of withdrawing these large numbers of troops at the present time.
In disagreeing, President Nixon was hoping that, if political stability
were maintained, Europeans and Americans might possibly be able to reach
an accord on mutual and balanced force reductions and strategic arms
limitations.
President Nixon's resolve was again confirmed by Secretary of Defense
Laird who stated on November 30, 1970, just prior to his departure for the
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (October 12, 1970), p. 1333.

North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, that the Administration's
intention to maintain the same force capabilities in Europe would be
reflected in the budget request to Congress for Fiscal year 1972. On
December 3, 1970, in a message read by Secretary of State Rogers at the
opening session of the same North Atlantic Council's meeting, President
Nixon stated:
We have agreed that NATO's conventional forces must not
only be maintained, but in certain key areas strengthened.
Given a similar approach by our Allies, the United States
will maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and
will not reduce them unless there is a reciprocal action
from our adversaries. We will continue to talk with our
NATO allies with regard to how we can meet our responsi-
bilities together.
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs in April of 1971, also reiterated President Nixon's resolve,
The goal of the Department of Defense is to assure a defense
capability to the US and its friends and Allies around the
world adequate to provide the realistic deterrence which will
enable us to achieve the President's aims of peace in our
generation. y
Once again, in his 1972 State of the Union message, President Nixon
repeated the necessity of maintaining America's dominant military strength
as the greatest possible guarantee of world peace.
From the preceding examples, it would appear that President Nixon
intends to keep the US troop commitments to NATO at roughly the same level
during the remainder of his first term in office. In doing so, he has
o
Ibid . (December 7, 1970), pp. 1620-1621.
9
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance
Act of 1971
,
Hearing, Part I, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., April 27-29, May 4-6,
1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p.' 52.
William Randolph Hearst Jr., "Our Number One Priority," Seattle Post-
Intelligencer
, January 23, 1972.
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attempted to reassure the US allies that a precipitate unilateral reduc-
tion of US forces from Europe would not occur. Any future decision to
carry out troop withdrawals would be made only on a basis of mutual con-
sultation with US allies and a reciprocal reduction on the part of Warsaw
Pact forces. In addition to starting that US troop levels would be main-
tained, the NATO allies have been instructed that the US expects them to
continue to maintain and improve their own troop strengths.
This reassurance on the part of President Nixon does not however
mean that long-range changes are not being contemplated for the future.
The Administration is well aware of the strong pressures, not only in the
United States, but in all NATO countries, to devote a larger proportion of
the national budget to domestic, social and economic needs. In early 1969,
President Nixon initiated overtures that hinted at the possibility of a
reassessment of American foreign policy towards Western Europe. Stressing
the idea that current alliances must be pragmatic and flexible, he stated:
In today's world, what kind of an alliance shall we strive
to build? I believe we must build an alliance strong
enough to deter those who would threaten war; close enough
to provide for continuous and far-reaching consultation;
trusting enough to accept a diversity of views; realistic
enough to deal with the world as it is; flexible enough
to explore new channels of constructive cooperation.
Former Undersecretary of State Elliot Richardson, addressing the Inter-
national Studies Group of American Political Scientists Association con-
vention in New York in September of 1969, also hinted that a possible
reevaluation might occur. He implied that any foreign policy not capable
12
of flexible adjustments was in trouble almost by definition.
Richard M. Nixon, op. cit .
12
Elliot L. Richardson, "The Foreign Policy of the Nixon Administration:






One of the main themes in both President Nixon's State of the
Union message of January 1970, and of his Congressional report in
February 1970, was that a reevaluation of the present US involvement in
international affairs was underway. On these -occasions, unlike any pre-
vious proclamations, he stressed the importance that US allies must assume
additional determination of their destinies. He stated in his State of
the Union message that both the US and Europe felt that Western Europe
13
could and should assume additional responsibility for their defense.
Although this was not a declaration by the United States' Administration
that cuts were to be made in US forces in Europe, President Nixon's "New
Strategy for Peace" did hint at the possibility.
A more balanced association and a more genuine partner-
ship are in America's interest. As this process
advances, the burden and responsibilities balance
must gradually be adjusted to reflect the economic and
political realities of European progress.-*-^
He ref firmed however, his pledge that the US would not isolate itself
from the affairs of Europe.
Stronger emphasis was apparent in his report to Congress on the
"United States Foreign Policy of the 1970' s." In it he reemphasized:
Our allies are no longer willing to have the alliance
rest only on American prescriptions—and we are no
longer willing to have our alliances depend on their
potency and sustenance primarily on American
contributions . 16
13
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (January 26, 1970), p. 59.
l4
Ibid . (February 23, 1970), p. 204.
15
Ibid. (February 23, 1970), p. 205.
1 fi
"Partial Text of Nixon's Foreign Policy Report," Seattle Post-
Intelligencer
, February 10, 1972.
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As illustrated, President Nixon has been attempting since 1969 to
stress the importance of an American foreign policy doctrine founded on
principles of flexibility, pragmatism, and cooperation. Despite the
pledge of the European NATO allies to boost their contribution to the
common defense by an additional $1 billion over the next five years,
internal US pressures for reducing the military budget are only likely
17
to grow.
In addition to stressing the importance of reevaluating American
foreign policy objectives, Administration officials are considering whether
technological advances in weaponry and the prospect of an improved situation
in Europe might not warrant the adoption of a new military strategy for
NATO. As the present strategy of "flexible response," requiring that NATO
be prepared to fight both a large-scale conventional war and a nuclear war,
appears questionable, a new strategy, hopefully, would not only be militarily
effective against the Soviet nuclear capability, but also less expensive
to maintain. In a letter to Secretary of Defense Laird, Senator Mansfield
voiced his opinion that the present strategy did not appear adequate to
respond to the needs of the current threat.
17
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Why the U.S. Will Not Take G.I.'s out
of Europe Now," U.S. News and World Report (December 7, 1970), p. 59.
NATO allied leaders pledged to assume a greater share of the defense
burden by offering $1 billion over the next five years for defense spend-
ing. West Germany agreed to contribute $100 million for an integrated
communications system, an aircraft shelter program, and various other
defense projects. Italy, Netherlands, and Denmark offered small contribu-
tions for qualitative changes, and Britain pledged 4 additional close-air
support squadrons. The British additionally agreed to avail a reserve
armored regiment and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal . All of these
pledges contributed substantially to the improvement of the NATO infra-
structure and national forces.
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I am increasingly doubtful of the ability of our large conven-
tional forces to offer any effective non-nuclear flexible
response to Soviet conventional attack. If our conventional
forces must in fact depend on early use of even low-yield
nuclear weapons to carry out their mission and survive, I fail
to see how this provides for any form of flexibility in the
manner of our response to aggression. Such early use of
even tactical nuclear weapons would clearly open a nuclear
war which would quickly escalate.
William Beecher also reported that the National Security Council was
examining several options for a new strategy which would adjust to the
growth in Soviet nuclear power and to the decline in the forces and funds
19being devoted by NATO members to their non-nuclear forces.
Among the options under consideration is one which would employ a
long-range withdrawal of up to 250,000 of the close to 300,000 troops
still stationed in Western Europe. Heavy reliance would be placed on
clean tactical nuclear weapons . Proponents of this view contend that the
present tactical nuclear weapons stockpiled in Western Europe are obsolete
and, if used, would likely entirely destroy the area NATO is supposed to
defend, that is, West Germany. Even if it is possible to develop "clean"
nuclear weapons with a low yield, ensuring low collateral damage, any
emphasis on their construction would imply a readiness to employ them at
the outset of an attack.
At the other extreme of options under consideration is the so-called
"firebreak" strategy which would emphasize building conventional forces for
18
U.S. Congress, Congressional Record
,
"Letter: Reduction of U.S. Troops
in Western Europe—exchange between Senator Mansfield and Melvin Laird,"
92d Cong., 1st Sess., (1971), CXVII, No. 69, p. S6809.
19
William Beecher, "U.S. Conducting a Broad Review of NATO Strategy,"
New York Times , November 9, 1970, p. 12.
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a conventional war of 90 days or more. Such a strategy would necessitate
American troop levels to be at least 250,000 men. Nuclear weapons would
20
be used only as a last resort.
Somewhere between these two extremes lies the current NATO strategy
of flexible response with its nuclear credibility and between 150,000 and
200,000 troops. Any minor skirmish would be met with minimal force, while
a massive conventional attack would be met at a fairly early date with
tactical nuclear weapons.
Thus, while the Nixon Administration is prepared to maintain the
present NATO force level in keeping with the current strategy of flexible
response, a major reappraisal of the strategy itself is liable to occur.
Taking into account political, economic, and military realities of the
1970' s, a major decision on US troop levels could occur at any future date.
Although the general scale of American international involvement is
already witnessed to be on the decline, President Nixon's speech of June
1969 clearly states that America will not, under any circumstances, alienate
itself from the world.
Imagine for a moment, if you will, what would happen to
this world if America were to become a dropout in assuming
the responsibility for defending peace and freedom in the
world. As every world leader knows, and as even the most
outspoken critics of America would admit, the rest of the
world would live in terror. *-
20T...Ibid .
21
S. L. R. Harrison, "Nixon Era and NATO," NATO's Fifteen Nations
,
Vol. 14, No. 5 (October-November, 1969), p. 16.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN NATO
U.S. Troops Stationed in Western Europe
Recent official figures place the number of US forces stationed in
Western Europe at about 300,000 men. Approximately 250,000 of these men
are assigned to the European Command (USEUC0M) and 50,000 men are attached
22
to non-USEUCOM commands. Although no official country by country break-
down is available, the London Institute for Strategic Studies places the
majority of these forces in West Germany—roughly 200,000 men.
In addition to the 300,000 military troops, there are approximately
251,000 other military-related US personnel in Europe: 24,000 civilians
23
working for USEUC0M and 227,000 dependents of US servicemen.
U.S. Defense Expenditures for Western Europe
Estimates of all direct, United States' NATO-related expenditures
range from twelve to fourteen billion dollars annually. This excludes the
American nuclear strategic forces expenditures which would be maintained
regardless of the US conventional commitment to Western Europe. Two
figures however, which when properly defined, are applicable to US defense
spending toward the common defense in Europe. In February 1970, before
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, both of these values were
22
The European Command (USEUC0M) is composed of all commands located within
Western Europe, Spain and the Mediterranean (i.e. the US naval 6th fleet),
whereas non-USEUCOM commands are those commands composed of personnel, al-
though physically stationed in Europe, who are engaged primarily in intel-
ligence and communications activities and report directly to agencies
located within the United States.
23
(1) U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Europe, United States Troop Levels in Europe: Report on Staff Survey
Mission to Europe
, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., May 2-24, 1970 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 5.
(2) London Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1970-
1971 (London, 1970), p. 3.
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submitted and explained by Mr. Hillenbrand, the Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs.
The first figure, $2.9 billion annually, includes:
1. the cost of maintaining all the US military and civilian
personnel actually located in Western Europe;
2. the cost of operating and maintaining the facilities used
by these personnel;
3. ail operating costs for the United States' Sixth Fleet in
the Mediterranean.
This figure, however, does not include major procurement costs and indirect
logistics and administrative expenditures for support from outside Western
Europe.
The second figure is approximately $14 billion annually. In addition
to the $2.9 billion required for the European-based forces, this value in-
cludes:
1. the expenditures required for maintaining all US general purpose
forces not actually stationed in Europe but maintained primarily
for useage in a European emergency (these forces consist of con-
siderably more divisions and naval strength than those that are
stationed in Europe);
2. the costs of all US-based support for these US-based reserve
troops;
3. a considerable share of the estimated training costs for both
the US-based and the European-based forces;
4. expenditures for the US military aid program.
This figure, however, excludes expenditures incurred by the Department of
Defense for military research and development, retired service personnel's
pay, and all civilian and military pay increases. In short, the $14 billion
figure represents approximately what would be saved if all US NATO-oriented
forces and support troops were entirely deactivated.
24
U.S., Congress, House, Commitee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe,




91st Cong., 2d Sess., February 17-April 9, 1970 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1970), pp. 33-34.
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In fiscal 1969 it was estimated that the United States defense ex-
penditure entering the international balance-of-payments in Western Europe
was approximately $1.6 billion. With cash receipts of almost $0.8 billion,
a deficit of $0.8 billion resulted. Matters became more severe in fiscal
1970 when the total deficit of US defense spending in Europe grew to $0.9
25billion. As a result of this deficit, there has been considerable support
for the belief that annual costs could be reduced if US forces were returned
from Europe and were stationed intact and ready for a possible rapid return
to Europe. A 1969 study of budgetary savings from dual-basing one division
illustrated that some savings would result. The Department of Defense how-
ever disagreed when substantial numbers of troops were considered. It main-
tained that the cost to station these troops in the United States would increase
due to the requirement for two sets of equipment: one in the US for training
27
purposes, the other in Europe for combat useage. The concept of pre-
positioning the equipment was additionally criticized. It was felt that the
United States would have limited chances of succeeding in a conventional
European war unless sufficient warning was given well in advance of actual
hostilities. It therefore seems apparent that any reduction in US defense
expenditures would occur only if the troops returning from Europe were either
entirely demobilized or completely removed from the reserve ranks of the US
NATO forces. The possible consequences of an action such as this will be
discussed later.
25
U.S., Congress, Farbstein, op. cit
. ,
p. 13.
U.S., Congress, House, United States Relations with Europe in the Decade
of the 1970' s. p. 459.
27





It is well to note at this time that the balance-of-payments deficit
may also be different than the US defense deficit. This is due to addi-
tional factors which are taken into account in calculating the total
balance-of-payments deficit. One factor, for example, might be the effect
that the foreign exchange earnings from the US defense expenditures in
Europe have on American commercial exports. Additionally, US defense ex-
penditures are used to hire "local" personnel to staff the Department of
Defense positions throughout Europe. From fiscal 1969 to fiscal 1970, these
28
expenditures increased some $20 million to a total of $280 million. It is
therefore not possible to precisely predict the net effect the US defense





MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE
Any assessment of the military balance between the NATO forces and the
Warsaw Pact involves a comparison of the strengths of men and equipment, in-
cluding nuclear weapons; consideration of geographical advantages; deployment
and training schedules; logistic support capabilities; and the variations of
ideologies. As the relationship between the East and the West is unpredictable,
these values are difficult to quantify.
Ground Forces
The ground forces commands are basically divided into three geographical
regions for NATO: Northern, Central, and Southern. Overlapping coverage
problems exist as the Northern command covers not only Norway but also the
Baltic region. The Soviet Union faces a similar dilemma in that specific
circumstances may determine whether Warsaw Pact forces are committed to the
Baltic area or to Germany. For this reason, the Institute for Strategic
Studies grouped the Northern and Central commands into one homogeneous entity.
Ground Formations
29 30
No. /Cent. Europe ' So. Europe
Category NATO W.P. (USSR's) NATO W.P. (USSR's)
Ground forces available
to Commanders in peace-
time (division equiv.)
-armored 8 31 (19) 6 12 (3)
-infantry, mechanized
and airborne 16 38 (21) 28 22 (30)
29
Includes, on the NATO side, the commands for which the Allied Forces Central
Europe and Allied Forces Northern Europe commanders have responsibility. France
is not included. On the Warsaw Pact side it includes the command for which the
Pact High Commander has responsibility, but excludes the armed forces of Bulgaria,
Hungary and Rumania. Soviet units normally stationed in Western USSR and such
troops as might be committed to the Baltic theater of operations have, however,
been included on the Warsaw Pact side.
Includes, on the NATO side, the Italian, Greek, and Turkish land forces and such
American and British units as would be committed to the Mediterranean theater of
operation, and on the Warsaw Pact side, the land forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and
Rumania, and such Soviet units normally stationed in Hungary and Southern USSR as
might be committed to the Mediterranean theater.
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If French formations (not part of NATO's integrated command structure)
31
were included, two mechanized divisions would be added to the NATO totals.
As these figures do not reflect accurate quantitative values for the
size of each bloc's division, the comparison is slightly misleading. It
would therefore be more advantageous to compare the total numbers of avail-
able men.
Manpower (figures in thousands)
No. /Cent. Europe. So. Europe
Category NATO W.P. (USSR's) NATO W.P. (USSR's)
Combat and direct
support troops
available 580 900 (585) 525 370 (75)
If French forces were included, the NATO figures for Northern and Central
Europe would be increased by perhaps 40,000 men.
As the mobilization of reserve units and the movements of reinforcements
would drastically affect these figures, it is well to investigate the mobili-
zation capacities of each bloc. It has been estimated that the force of 31
Soviet divisions in Central Europe might be increased to 70 in well under a
32
month if mobilization were unimpeded. Various reasons are offered for
this flexibility, however, if a European crisis developed gradually enough
to permit full reinforcement, the West, with its larger armies, could negate
the immediate mobilization advantage of the Warsaw Pact nations. As the
majority of NATO's reserve troops are stationed outside Europe, time would
become the dominant factor in mobilization of this type. In total numbers,
NATO has approximately 3,374,000 troops (including France-3,702,000) while
31
These are the two divisions stationed in Germany. There are three more in
France.
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the Warsaw Pact forces number 2,837,000.
Equipment
In a comparison of equipment, one point if readily apparent: the
Warsaw Pact forces are armed almost exclusively with Soviet, or Soviet
designed material. This standardization affords them the flexibility and
simplicity of movement and training that the West does not have. Because
of the various different models of equipment used by the NATO forces, con-
siderable duplication of effort is experienced.
Noticeable differences result when numbers of weapons are compared.
Perhaps the most significant is the relative tank strengths.
No. /Cent. Europe So. Europe
Category NATO W.P. (USSR's) NATO W.P. (USSR's)
Main battle tanks
available in
peacetime 5500 14,000 (8,000) 2100 5000 (1400)
The East's superiority, however, is somewhat offset by the more modern
weapons NATO has available, both in tanks and ground anti-tank weapons. The
comparison also reflects the essentially defensive role that NATO affirms
and adheres to. In conventional artillery, both blocs are approximately
equal in strength, however, NATO is likely to have slightly superior fire-
power. In addition to the logistic ability of sustaining higher rates of
fire, this can be attributed to the greater accuracy, modernness, and
lethality of its weapons.
Aircraft
To enable ground troops to remain effective both day and night, a con-










provided by a combination of warning and communication systems, surface-
to-air weapons, and tactical aircraft. Although numbers of aircraft in-
dicate that NATO is markedly inferior, NATO aircraft have a greater average
capability as they are more often multipurpose rather than mission-limited.
No. /Cent. Europe So. Europe
Category NATO • W.P. (USSR's) NATO W.P. (USSR's)
Tactical aircraft in
operational service
-light bombers 16 240 (200)
-interceptors 350 2000 (900)
-fighter/attack 1400 1300 (1000)
-reconnaissance 400 400 (300)
It is difficult to determine the extent to which the greater performance
and versatility of the NATO aircraft would offset the greater numbers of
the Warsaw Pact. It is evident, however, that a direct comparison of the
two air arms in terms solely of numbers may be misleading and could under-
estimate NATO's true capability. Although the East maintains a numerical
superiority of aircraft in Europe, the NATO inventory world-wide is far
greater than that of the Warsaw Pact. As with numbers of ground forces,
NATO has greater total reinforcement capabilities. Considering all of
these variables, a comparison in finite terms becomes difficult. The
Warsaw Pact's numerical advantage, however, remains an ever-present reminder
of the quick response strength available from the East.
Theatre Nuclear Weapons
As an inevitable overlap occurs when discussing the differences be-
tween "tactical" and "strategic" nuclear weapons, only brief mention will
be made of each. A comparison of "strategic" nuclear weapons was best





















These figures also take into account the multiplying factors attributable
to the multiple independently-targe table re-entry vehicles (MIRV's).
Confirmed hardened site figures are classified and unavailable, how-
ever, American ICBM's are known to be emplaced in underground silos
capable of withstanding a blast of approximately 300 pounds per square inch
(psi). It has been estimated that approximately 1140 of the Soviet's
1300 ICBM's are also encased in hardened underground silos. The London
Institute for Strategic Studies further speculates that about 50 percent of
34
all Soviet IRBM's and ' MRBM s are as well underground.
A somewhat looser comparison is made when discussing "tactical" nuclear
weapons. NATO has some 7000 "tactical" nuclear warheads, deliverable by
some 2250 variable vehicles: aircraft, short-range missiles, and artillery.
Soviet warheads are approximately 3500, delivered by roughly comparable air-
craft and missile systems as exist in NATO. It is also significant to note
that, although some of the delivery vehicles are in the hands of non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact nations, the warheads are not. The roost important result of this
comparison is that the Soviet Union has the ability to launch a nuclear
offensive on a massive scale if desired, or to match any NATO aggression with








are employed, an immediate escalation will result in a "strategic" nuclear
exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Naval Forces
The comparison of regional naval strengths poses the same type of problem
that was witnessed when ground formations were discussed. As ships move be-
tween fleets, fleets move over great distances, and ships act as combined
units, it is difficult and inappropriate to alienate ships numerically. The
Institute for Strategic Studies did, however, compile an approximation of
naval strengths. None of the figures include the French Navy which is
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The comparisons show that the NATO/US Navy7 is predominantly a carrier-
strike force relying heavily upon the flexibility of an embarked air wing.
The Soviet Union, by contrast, relies largely upon land-based aircraft and
ship-borne air defense missiles. The lack of carrier-borne aircraft would
no doubt limit the Warsaw Pact forces effective radius of action should a
conflict occur.
To counter the NATO carrier-strike force dominance, the Soviet Union
relies heavily upon its submarine fleet. To replace the older conventional
diesel-powered submarines, a major effort toward the construction of nuclear-
powered vessels was begun several years ago. Soviet construction however, has
not limited itself to submarines
—
portions of the present Soviet fleet have
been built in the last few years. Primary emphasis, other than on nuclear
submarines, has been on the "Kresta" class cruiser, the "Kashin" class
destroyer, and the "Osa" class fast patrol boat. The following table illu-
strates the Soviet changes that have occurred from 1968 to 1971 with regard





















It is apparent then, that an assessment and comparison of an overall
military balance is difficult. Differing roles in peacetime and wartime must
be accounted for, deployment areas and schedules become important, and per-
haps more significant, the nature and duration of any conflict is paramount
to any comparison. If a conflict were prolonged, NATO air/ground force
superiority would be important, as would Soviet submarine strength. If it
were short, Warsaw Pact air/ground forces may dominate the land war while
NATO's carrier-based air wing would function as the dominant naval strength.
In short, as environmental factors are unpredictable, any analysis of this
nature must remain flexible in both quantitative and qualitative assessments. 35
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All facts and figures were obtained from:
London Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1969-1970
(London, 1969), pp. 62-63.
,
The Military Balance 1970-1971 (London, 1970), pp. 90-91.

INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES
OE A U.S. UNILATERAL TROOP REDUCTION
In April 1970, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt met with various
political organizations during a brief visit to the United States. In
light of the political unrest for withdrawal of portions of the US troops
from Western Europe, one of his primary objectives in speaking with them
was to obtain reassurance that the United States would continue to honor
its NATO commitment. At the White House on April 10, Chancellor Brandt
alluded to the necessity for the United States military presence in Europe
as a requirement for international peace and tranquility. On April 12
}
he
was a guest on "Meet the Press." In response to the question why the
American commitment to the defense of Europe must be expressed in the
present number of troops, he said:
There are two strong arguments which I want to present
. .
.
(yOne is that this is not only a military problem. It is a
political and psychological problem as well. In at least
parts of Europe, a major withdrawal of American troops,
unilaterally from Europe, would be regarded as a step
towards, well, more or less, Soviet hegemony, as far as
Europe is concerned. My other argument is this: there
fi) may be a chance during the next few years to come, to
enter into serious negotiations on mutual balanced force
reductions. At least we should be prepared for it. But
I think an effective alliance with an important American
presence in Europe is one of the preconditions of reason-
able talks on mutual reductions of forces in Europe,
especially in Central Europe. 36
On April 20, within a week of Chancellor Brandt's State visit to
Washington, Senator Mansfield addressed the United States Senate on the
0£
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sixteenth Meeting
of the North Atlantic Assembly, Report of the United States Delegation to
the Sixteenth Meeting of Parliaments from the North Atlantic Assembly
Countries Held at the Hague, November 6 through November 11, 1970,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., August, 1971 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1971), p. 86.
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issue of US troop commitments in Western Europe. He stressed that,
contrary to the belief apparently held in the United States and Europe,
his amendment did not demand that the United States quit Europe, rather,
it implied:
... a substantial reduction of United States forces
permanently stationed in Europe can be made without
adversely affecting either our (US) resolve or ability-.,
to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty.
He further emphasized that present conditions in Europe, as well as in the
United States, made possible this substantial reduction in the American
military presence in Europe.
Numerous significant developments have occurred in international
relations since Senator Mansfield initially introduced his resolution for
US troop reductions. Some have strengthened his argument, others have
not. They have, however, compelled world leaders to reassess their foreign
policy strategies.
Perhaps one of the most important events in European politics was the
signing of the Soviet-West German Treaty in Moscow on August 12, 1970.
Even if it had not been ratified, its initial signature alone would have
made it an historic event. The overture made to East Germany and Poland
from the Federal Republic of Germany; the satisfactory agreement on Berlin
reached by the Big Four Powers: France, Great Britain, the United States,
and the Soviet Union; the October 1970 State visit of French President
Pompidou to the Soviet Union; and the interest throughout Europe concerning
a European Security Conference have been other significant East-West










The Soviet-West German Treaty has been proclaimed by some as the
39
commencement of a new era of peaceful relations in Europe. It has, at
the same time, given rise to serious doubts. If the ratification of the
treaty on 17 May 1972, accomplishes an easement in cultural, economic and
political tensions between the East and the West, Chancellor Brandt's
"Ostpolitik" will have been successful. If, however, it permanently
cements the division of the two Germanies and weakens NATO's political
unity, the Soviet Union will have made a positive gain in their ideological
quest for dominance. Only future developments in the international political
arena will clarify whether the treaty will be suitable to attain the reduc-
tion of the long-felt tensions.
On March 19, 1970, for the first time since 1945, the Heads of Government
40
of the two parts of Germany formally met at a conference. Both participants
had their respective objectives. West German Chancellor Brandt was desirous
of achieving closer and more normal relations between the two Germanies, a
reduction in human hardships caused by the physical division of the Germanies,
and balanced force and armament reductions between the East and the West.
East German Chairman Stoph sought formal diplomatic recognition for the
German Democratic Republic. As a result of this first meeting, there was
considerable speculation concerning the possibilities of reducing inter-
German tension. At their second meeting (21 May, 1970) however, Chancellor
Brandt's refusal to acknowledge formal diplomatic recognition for East
Germany caused a stalemate in negotiations. Although tension still exists
between the two Germanies, some relaxation has occurred as a result of these
talks.
39
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p. 18. See Appendix III.
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Several rounds of negotiations have also been held between the
Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. Although no definite results have
been experienced, these negotiations clearly demonstrate the desire of the
Federal Republic of Germany to seek solutions to ideological problems through
peaceful means.
Diplomatic exchanges concerning Berlin have also occurred since Senator
Mansfield first introduced his resolution. On March 26, 1970, the first
talks in a decade were opened between the Big Four Powers: France, Great
Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The main points discussed
in March, and later again in April of 1970, concerned access routes to West
41
Berlin and the easement of humanitarian hardships suffered by all Germans.
In September of 1971, an accord over Berlin was reached which further reduced
tensions between the two Germanies
.
Another significant development in East-West relations occurred in
October of 1970: French President Pompidou made a formal State visit to
the Soviet Union. His visit, concluding with a Franco-Soviet Declaration
of Cooperation, was of considerable importance as it marked, on France's
behalf, an approach to detente which was analagous to that of the Federal
Republic of Germany. It also continued the process of Franco-Soviet
rapprochement which had been initiated by former President deGaulle. Al-
though it would have appeared that President Pompidou' s visit to Moscow was
a sign of submission on the part of the West, he stressed with great emphasis
that closer relations between France and the Soviet Union were based entirely
upon France's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and its belief in the
42










A significant part of the Franco-Soviet Declaration was the interest
exhibited by both participants in the establishment of a European Security
43Conference. Western Europeans, while interested in such a conference,
have reservations concerning its timing, content and objectives. According
to the report of a special study mission on Europe by Representative Farbstein,
under no circumstances would the Western Europeans tolerate a conference un-
less all of the NATO signatories were participants, including the United
,
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States and Canada. Although the original Soviet proposal made no mention
of either of the North Atlantic powers, Representative Farbstein felt there
were no objections from the East to a US-Canadian participation. Another
apparent problem area, and perhaps equally significant to the formation of a
conference, is the lack of agreement on specific proposals to resolve. The
West appears interested in the status and access of Berlin while the East is
more concerned about the formal diplomatic recognition of East Germany. In
his book Detente Diplomacy , Timothy Stanley feels that the primary reason the
Soviets are extolling the virtues of a unified European conference is to cover
45
its 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion. By advocating a conference, perhaps the
West will overlook the Soviet's continued use of force in achieving its
political objectives. Even if the actuality of its formation is unlikely,
the conference has become a symbol of detente between the East and the West.
43
See Appendix IV.
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Several explanations also exist why the Soviet Union appears to be
promoting a detente with the West. One is undoubtedly the difficulty it
is experiencing on its Eastern front. The increase in the number of Soviet
divisions in the districts bordering on China and Outer Mongolia since 1965
has diverted considerable manpower and equipment which would likely have
been used to support and strengthen their Western forces. As conditions in
Western Europe have remained relatively stable for a considerable period of
time, perhaps foremost on Moscow's agenda is its preoccupation with Communist
China. West German Chancellor Brandt capsulized this attitude:
The Soviets may say that they are agreeing on Berlin for a
detente in Europe and not for any other reason, but, you
must remember, they've got China on their doorstep; they ,,
have a lot to gain by putting their European house in order.
Another reason for the Soviet Union to seek a rapprochement is to obtain
economic and technological aid from the West. The Soviet Union and their
Warsaw Pact allies apparently want Western technology and machinery badly
enough to assure peace in Europe. In addition, growing consumer demands and
agricultural deficiencies within the Soviet Union are undoubtedly having
some affect on the Soviet society. A third, and perhaps more pessimistic
reason for the apparent Soviet rapprochement is, that with an effective
detente, the Soviet Union has a means of extending its power and influence
throughout Europe, hence, the world. Still another is the uncertainty that
exists in Moscow today: the Soviet general staff simply can not tell the
47
Kremlin what would happen if they (USSR) used force against the West.
Rather than risk unnecessary confrontation for what can be achieved peace-
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One thought would be well to reiterate at this time. Although the
Russian Eastern security is undoubtedly a problem and would be an impetus
in seeking stability in the West, the issues in Western Europe are too
closely aligned with historical fears, ideology and internal Soviet in-
securities and power struggles to permit a complete relaxation and accomo-
dation. In an article written for NATO's Fifteen Nations , Major General
(Dr.) M.W.J.M. Brockmeijer offered a cautionary comment.
The Soviet interpretation of "detente" means nothing else
than luring the Western European nations into a position
in which only Soviet interests are served . . . Soviet peace
only means integration into the Soviet commonwealth, where-
in there is no place for nation-states ... the Brezhnev
Doctrine is the writing on the wall, a serious warning for
everyone who wants freedom for himself and his people. ^"
With that "optimistic" outlook, let us turn to the possible consequences
of an American unilateral troop reduction from Western Europe.
From the end of World War II and until the formation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the only credible deterrent which kept the
Soviet Union from creeping further into Western Europe was the presence of
American forces. Once NATO was established, these forces became an integral
part in the total military superstructure that has since assumed and
accomplished that role. Many Western Europeans feel, however, that, al-
though NATO itself is a functional organization, the presence of US forces
in Europe today still remains the only credible deterrent.
Since 1945, the Soviet Union has been expanding its strategic nuclear
capability. In fact, where the United States once had a commanding
48
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superiority, the Soviet Union has now nearly equaled in total numbers
the strategic nuclear weapons available to the US. Consequently, the
relationship between the conventional military forces of the NATO
alliance and the Warsaw Pact assumes additional significance. As early
as 1968, General Wheeler stated:
... it is clearer today than ever before that we (US)
need the North Atlantic Alliance and it needs us... one
inescapable requirement is to keep the Alliance cohesive
and militarily strong, despite non-military pressures c- 1
that argue for increased and accelerated troop reductions.
Western Europeans are of the opinion that any diminution of NATO's con-
ventional capability, and especially a US reduction, would have the effect
52
of upsetting the precarious balance-of-power that now exists. If this
is correct, any military reduction of the US commitment to NATO would have
serious economic, military, political and psychological consequences in
both Europe and the United States.
At this point in the development , it is felt an additional statement
need be made concerning the scope of the analysis. As the study is
designed to analyze the possible repercussions to Europe and the United
States of a substantial US unilateral troop reduction from Western Europe,
no specific mention will be made of the Southern flank of NATO and the
myriad of problems that are presented by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact's presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean theatre. It is
none-the-less acknowledged that any consequences experienced in Western
Europe would as well likely be experienced to some degree in other
General Earle Wheeler, USA, "Strategic Tasks Facing the U.S.," Armed
Forces Staff College, Nuclear Warfare (Unclassified) (Norfolk: No. 611ASC)
,
August 31, 1968, pp. xiii-1.
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geographical areas of the European continent. For ease of discussion
therefore, only Western Europe shall be referred to.
EUROPE
Economic Consequences
Ever since the United States stationed military forces in Western
Europe, the European nations have been virtually unhampered in their post-
war rebuilding and economic expansion activities. West Germany, France,
Great Britain and other ravaged nations were able to completely rebuild and
replenish themselves in a very few years. They were able to accomplish these
feats only as a result of the stability assured by the presence of American
troops. In his special report to Congress, Representative Farbstein specific-
ally pointed out one of the more significant of these accomplishments— the
Common Market. As one European leader told Representative Farbstein in an
interview:
The United States has been the catalyst pushing Europe toward
unity, and has been the cement which held it together. With-
out the deep US involvement in NATO, Europe would have gone
off in many different directions at once.->3
With the Common Market recently expanding its membership to include
nearly all Western European nations, it is not felt that any drastic economic
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consequences would be experienced were a US troop reduction to occur.
If the major powers: France, Great Britain and West Germany, were not
united or bonded economically in some manner, however, a possible breakdown
in economic unity might result. Each nation might feel the need to assert






Economic trade considerations between the United States and Western
Europe will be discussed later.
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and the rest of the world. It is hoped that the existence of the Common
Market eliminates this possibility.
One positive reaction to a US force reduction might occur. In order
to fill the manpower void created by a US troop withdrawal, greater numbers
of individuals could be conscripted into the military services throughout
Europe. This might fulfill not only the NATO defense requirements, but as
well, reduce the current unemployment problems facing Western Europe. Accord-
ing to the West German Federal Labor Office, unemployment figures rose
from 268,200 in January 1971, to 375,600 in January 1972. Although
additional armed service members would not entirely alleviate this dilemma,
some strain on the German economy might be relieved. The same theory can
be applied to all Western European nations, not just West Germany. As the
concern in the United States is to reduce the military component, an opposite
effect might occur in the US. This will be mentioned in greater detail
when economic consquences to the United States are discussed.
A considerable amount of discussion and speculation has taken place over
the subjects of burden-sharing and balance-of-payments deficits. An interesting
attitude toward these topics was observed by Representative Farbstein on his
tour of Europe. Europeans argued that, as the US insisted on controlling the
nuclear weapons allocated for NATO's useage, it should be willing to pay
for that right. If the Europeans were given more leeway in nuclear matters,
they would not be so reluctant to absorb portions of the financial costs for
their maintenance. Timothy Stanley's analogy to US taxes is in apparent
agreement with this attitude.










American seem willing to accept progressive taxation at
home— in other words, the principle that the wealthier
pay higher rates. They apparently reject, however, the
notion that this principle is equitable internationally,
that is, for a country with 2 1/2 times the average per
capita income of the Alliance to pay at least twice as
high a "defense" tax—although this is just about the
case in some American personal income tax brackets. ->/
The obvious rebuttal to this argument is, of course, that America is
not the only recipient of this nuclear protection. The Europeans benefit
as much, and perhaps more than the United States, from this nuclear umbrella
and should accordingly share in alleviating its cost. Instead, the
Europeans have preferred to enjoy their prosperity and national independence
58
rather than pay the price of political union. As Senator Mansfield so
succinctly stated:
When the chips are down, it appears that a number of our
(US) European allies are more interested in their domestic
concerns than they are in the international scene which they
expect us to improve.-" 7
Several arguments have been offered justifying a US troop reduction.
Initially the aim of the United States was to encourage the formation of a
strong and unified Europe which would act as an equal partner with the US in
a shared defense of a perceivable threat. Perhaps it is time to reevaluate
that goal in light of the increased NATO firepower and mobility. The grow-
ing unity and strength of Western Europe may now be at such a level that
the Europeans themselves can assume greater responsibilities for their own
defense. Unfortunately, experience has shown that unless they are forced to
pay for their defense, the Europeans are likely not to be overly concerned
about it. The most credible way of forcing them to accept their
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responsibilities may be to trim the American forces throughout NATO and
its military structure. In an article entitled "We're Paying Too Much
for NATO," Senator Percy stipulated two alternatives to the solution:
unilateral troop reductions, or increased burden-sharing. He felt that,
as Europe was no longer a rubble-strewn continent, it could bear a much
larger defense burden. If the Europeans refused to accept this new
responsibility, reductions in US troop levels would become inevitable.
Senator Mansfield agreed entirely when he stated:
...there is no serious reason why the major nations of
Western Europe can not take over from the US the primary
responsibility for their own defense, especially conven-
tional defense. By doggedly insisting that the Europeans
should rely primarily on us (US) instead of each other,
we are subsidizing Europe's disunity and adventurism."^
One solution to this matter would be for the US to reduce the payment
deficits largely incurred from activities within Europe. This was discussed
rather thoroughly earlier when analyzing the costs and finances of main-
taining US troops in Europe. If it is in the interest of Europeans to
maintain the additional troops the US is apparently considering reducing,
they should assist in carrying the additional share of the payments neces-
sary to maintain these troops. Although the European Defense Improvement
Program (EDIP) began in 1970, a great deal remains to be done. Positive
steps have been taken by various NATO allies to absorb this possible impend-
ing loss of US forces, but to date, they have been unable to reduce the
tension that exists for a US troop reduction. European nations have pledged
James Doyle, "Retreat in the Senate," Progressive (July, 1971), P« 27.
/:
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to increase their defense spendings by $100 million in the next five
years. Although this demonstrates an effort on Europe's part, this
amount unfortunately only equals one ninth of the annual US balance-of-
payments deficits incurred by maintaining the present level of US troops
in Europe. NATO's "Euro-group," composed of the defense ministers of the
West European members, proposed "that they contribute $250 to $300 million
toward a reduction of US defense expenditures in Europe. President Nixon,
however, made it clear to NATO leaders that the US prefers increases in the
levels of forces and arms of European members rather than cash contributions
64
toward the support of the 300,000 US personnel stationed in Europe.
In short, with increased effort being displayed by the United States'
European allies, the effect of a troop reduction might be to stimulate a
certain degree of European "nationalism." Greater efforts might be made to-
ward covering the excessive defense expenditures incurred by the US and a
more equitable troop commitment arrangement might be effected. Under these
circumstances, the European nations who have never completely satisfied their
NATO military requirements might also be compelled into finally achieving




As NATO is primarily a defensive military alliance, an analysis of
speculative military consequences is somewhat more adaptable than economic
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repercussions. In order to properly perceive the military perspective, it
is necessary to recall the discussion of the military balance between the
Warsaw Pact and NATO forces.
The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations together comprise a
military force exceeding any previously witnessed in history. It also
exceeds any requirements needed for purely defensive purposes. For this
reason, the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat has not diminished, and in fact,
in some ways, increased. NATO forces still face a potential enemy with more
manpower and armored vehicles than it possesses, and as many tactical air-
craft and theatre nuclear weapons. While the US has modernized its inventory
of conventional warfare weapons, the Soviets have continually expanded theirs
in quantity. In addition to the quantitative improvements in the Soviet
Union's military capability, their forces are continually being trained and
mobilized. Eugene V. Rostow, former Under-secretary of State for President
Johnson, was adamant in his attack on the current theory that the Cold War is
over.
It is fashionable in Western Europe and the United States to
believe that the Cold War is over, that detente prevails, and
that the Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of collaboration
with the West. I have been unable to find any evidence to
support such a view. True, the NATO governments no longer
engage in vituperation with or about the Soviet Union. But
Soviet propaganda, at home and abroad, is still written in
vitriol. We have simply stopped listening. Soviet energy
presses outwards, patient and ingenious, flowing around
obstacles, taking advantage of every opening. It 'can be stopped
only by the calm deployment of unacceptable risks. °
Until the Soviet Union demonstrates a clear desire for peace and a
willingness to reduce its military strength, the United States would
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directly and adversely affect the credibility of the NATO military forces
by implementing a reduction at this time. As there are no signs on
Moscow's side of the Iron Curtain that a downgrading of defense posture is
being effected, the United States would be foolish to slacken the
69defensive structure and stature of the NATO allies. With a reduced
Western defense posture, the European balance-of-power would be upset
in favor of the Soviet bloc. Its affect on the entire security system in
Europe might be considerable.
A reduction of US forces from NATO might additionally offer temptations
to a nation that has avowed a policy of domination. In a testimony be-
fore the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, General Goodpaster implied that
there were clear indications of a long-range Soviet objective of achieving
a strategic and tactical power advantage in the European theatre. One
rather effortless way for the Soviet Union to achieve this tactical advantage
would be to convince Western Europe that a threat no longer existed and the
American presence was no longer required. Once the United States became
physically isolated from the European continent, it would be a matter of
time before Soviet dominance would be experienced throughout much of Europe.
It might be well to recall Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968)
.
As a result of these two dramatic experiences, the fear still prevails that,
if afforded an opportunity, the Soviet Union will continue to employ
military pressures as a means of accomplishing political goals. A
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unilateral American reduction might just create that environment. As
Senator Brock so adequately stated:
It is true that we are in a different age than Roosevelt,
Truman or Eisenhower, but it would be difficult to sell that
to the Hungarians and the Czechoslovakians . '
^
NATO's strategy has, on occasion, been compared to a "sword" and a
73
"shield." Both are necessary and complimentary—one is of little value
without the other. Were the NATO forces significantly reduced, the shield's
value would be diminished and the concept of the forward defense turned
into shambles. If this forward line of defense of the NATO nations were
weakened, it would be a relatively simple matter for the Russians, or their
allies, to advance across that line.
Political Consequences
Along with the economic and military consequences, political repercussions
are at best speculative. Unlike the economic unity afforded by the Common
Market, Europe is not politically unified. Numerous negotiations that are
currently being conducted might possibly affect the political future of
several nations, the North Atlantic Alliance, and perhaps the world, but, as
long as Western Europe remains a loose political conglomerate, NATO must not
be weakened. Only the Soviet Union stands to win from a fragmented Europe.
Were an American unilateral withdrawal to occur, additional political
danger to the West would result from the military superiority of the Warsaw
Pact nations. This superiority might be used to exert political pressures
on the West, thereby inducing them to redefine their policies, not
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necessarily in their own interests, but primarily in those of the
74
USSR.
As the present is an era of negotiation rather than confrontation, any
policy aimed at reducing tension must be conducted in an atmosphere of
security and stability. As has been demonstrated in recent months with
regard to the US withdrawal of military forces from Vietnam, the ability
to negotiate successfully is not strengthened by unilateral troop reductions
by one of the negotiating parties. Why would the Soviet negotiate for
troop reductions if they knew for certain that American troops would be
withdrawn regardless of the outcome of the negotiations? As the most bene-
ficial negotiation platform appears to be one of strength, any unilateral
reduction of American forces would weaken the NATO position on balanced
force reductions.
To engage in a unilateral process of withdrawal is not a
process of negotiation, it is a process by which the
prospects of successful negotiations are eliminated. ^
John Morse, an American participant at the Wehrunde Conference on NATO
held in Munich in February 1971, capsulized the damage that might result
from an American unilateral withdrawal of forces.
Defense and detente are the keystones of an alliance, the US
decision to unilaterally withdraw, without the remaining
allies concurrence, defeats these objectives. It reduces
the chances of exploring ways to settle a just peace through
negotiation. 7°
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Other significant negotiation efforts which might possibly be
destroyed by a US unilateral reduction are those of West German Chancellor
Willy Brandt. As his "Ostpolitik' is psychologically fragile, any action
which might affect the existing Western European balance of military power
could have a devastating af fect >Upon it and its current successes.
Psychological Consequences
Several psychological consequences might occur as a result of an
American reduction. Perhaps one of the more severe might be the belief that
the United States would not honor its treaty commitments. A troop with-
drawal might indicate to the world that the US resolve to come to the
assistance of her allies was questionable. America's post-Vietnam reassessment
seems likely to devalue, for some time to come, the political viability
of unilateral American action in a peacekeeping role. 77 President Nixon has
apparently captured, this mood with his low-profile approach to US foreign
policy. Some West Europeans fear that the US is occupied with Vietnam and
domestic difficulties and may one day cease to serve as an effective protector
78
of Europe. Others seriously question the United States* leadership in the
n • 79alliance. Averill Harriman, the American who chaired the 1951 joint US-
Britain-France committee which established each nation's potential contribu-
tions to NATO, is quoted as having said:
It never occurred to me that we would continue to keep such
large forces for as long as we have. The plan was for the
European nations to build their own forces as their economies
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recovered, stimulated by the Marshall Plan. Unfortunately,
we have substantially maintained our force levels--this
has become such a rigid tradition that any reduction on
our side gives credence to the feeling among Europeans that
we are turning our backs to them and retreating into isola-
tionism. °o
As none of the Western European nations have access to, or control of,
the US tactical nuclear weapons, they must rely entirely on their belief that
the United States would employ them if the need arose. Because of the
strategic balance existing between the Soviet and US long-range missile
capabilities, there is the fear that the US would not be willing to use
81
tactical nuclear weapons in defense of Europe.
Another fear that might arise is that the US would be reluctant to
physically join a European conflict once the number of US troops maintained
in Europe were reduced. When he encountered arguments similar to this on
his fact-finding mission to Europe, Representative Farbstein pointed out
that the United States would not sacrifice 50,000 Americans any more than it
would 300,000. If the Soviet bloc initiated hostilities against Western
Europe, the United States would respond with whatever force was necessary to
repel such an attack. He further stated that the real deterrent to war in
Europe was the US nuclear capability and that this would be present regard-
less of how many troops the US maintained in Europe. It was therefore the
presence of US troops rather than the numbers involved that were important to
82
the credibility of the NATO military structure. Russia and the US NATO
allies know that as long as there is a token amount of American troops
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guaranteeing US involvement in any assault, the nuclear formula takes
. 83force.
As discussed earlier in political consequences, an indication now to
the Soviet Union that reductions in NATO forces would come without recipro-
cal reductions in Warsaw Pact forces might increase their reluctance to
reduce by negotiation. They may also question US sincerity to honor its
commitments. A subsequent "test" of the West's credibility may result
—
perhaps once again restricting access to Berlin. A "symbolic" American
force—mainly flags instead of bodies—would not carry much credibility in
84
the eyes of the Russians. In any instance, the US can not afford to be
seriously ' challenged on matters of this nature. As only they have control
of the tactical nuclear weapons dispersed throughout Western Europe, they must
remain credible.
It is hoped that we are all fearful of, and desirous of avoiding a
nuclear war at any -cost and under any circumstances. Were the level of con-
ventional forces sufficiently reduced, however, a point might be reached
where the nuclear threshold was so low that any conventional conflict would
erupt into a devastating nuclear holocaust. Was this not the major reason
in 1967 for adopting the still existent NATO strategy of "flexible response?"
As a result of the suggestions that the United States reduce the size of her
military commitment to Europe, many Europeans are fearful that this reduc-
tion might signal a return to the former NATO strategy of "massive retalia-
te
tion." It would then seem that the present strategy is viable only as
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long as a sizeable NATO military force is present within Western Europe.
In the final analysis, it appears that the ultimate safety of Western
Europe, and indirectly the US itself, is guaranteed only by the effective-
ness and credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. Were a troop reduction to
occur, the willingness to employ nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe
might become suspect.
Combining the previously mentioned economic, military, political and
psychological effects of an American troop reduction, a pronounced European
readjustment might occur. Such an action by US administrators might lead
Western Europe into its first major reorientation since the end of World War
II. Europe might move toward neutralism in the East- West struggle. It may
encourage unilateral policies with independent, non-aligned nations, a move,
without question, of concern to US security interests. Another European
reaction might be panicked efforts to augment their existing military
capabilities, thereby creating an additional source of tension between the
East and the West. What affect would a rearming of Western Europe have upon
the Soviet Union? As Western Europe does not have a credible nuclear
deterrent, an attempt might be made to develop and acquire an independent
nuclear defense of its own. Once this had occurred, there would be the
chance that both sides, without any real intention on either part, might
find themselves in the midst of a nuclear war.
.
Additionally, the Alliance may entirely crumble and the whole fabric
of stability in Europe be destroyed. As President Nixon has obviously con-
ducted secret talks with US adversaries, Europeans may feel that the US
Reference is made here to the 1971 secret US-North Vietnamese talks con-




had either made some sort of hegemonial deal with the Russians or had
o -i
devalued its interest in Europe. In either case, the Alliance might
unravel entirely and the Western Europeans might then seek separate
accommodations with whomever is available. Another possibility exists:
the Europeans, sensing that the Soviet threat has dissipated, might reduce
88
their military defense posture to coincide with the American reduction.
The outcome of an action such as this would be quite easily discernable
—
an utterly defenseless Western Europe which the United States would then
feel morally committed to defend. For these reasons it is felt that any
advancement to reduce NATO's conventional forces should be resisted until




As was illustrated in the earlier discussion of US Defense Expendi-
tures for Western Europe, negligible US budgetary reductions would appear
unless the troops returned from Europe were deactivated or those ear-marked
for NATO's use were either reassigned or themselves demobilized. Although
a redeployment of troops from Europe would ease the US balance-of-payments
deficit, additional US domestic costs would be incurred from maintaining
them in a quickly deployable status. Senator Mansfield made one of the few
positive statements concerning budgetary savings when he addressed Congress
on May 11, 1971. He related that by passing and implementing his resolution,
financial savings to the American taxpayer may be as high as $1 1/2
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billion. In estimating that amount, he was referring to the reduction
and deactivation of one half of the US troop commitment to NATO.
Not only have specific financial savings not been delineated in troop
reduction discussions, but as well, no mention has been made of the origin
of the troops which will be withdrawn. Would they consist of artillery forces,
supply forces, infantry forces, naval forces? Although Senator Mansfield's
proposal would yield positive financial savings, he also only referred to
general troop "cuts." In a study of a selective process of troop reductions,
it was estimated that, if 50,000 support troops stationed in Europe and one
Army division of reserves stationed in the US were deactivated, savings would
90
exceed $900 million per year. The study additionally showed that over a
four year period, $6.4 billion could be eliminated from the US defense
budget. This $6. A billion could then be employed in solving internal US
domestic problems. With a drastic troop reduction, an equally significant
and realistic possibility would be a decline in defense-related spending.
What effect might this have on the stability and growth of the American economy?
Another unavoidable problem is that certain industries, workers, and
communities which are heavily involved in defense activities may encounter
numerous readjustment problems, even if the overall workload demand is kept
high. Shifting people and resources to new uses is time consuming and would
create considerable hardships for the parts of the economy that might become
affected. In some industries, the dependence on defense contracts is
89
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remarkably high. Some geographical areas are as well highly dependent.
In 1960, representing about 9% of total US employment, more than 6 million
persons were employed by the Federal government and industrial defense-
92
related activities. Between the fiscal years 1965 and 1967, the proportion
of total public and private employment for the Department of Defense rose
from 8.6% to 10.3%. One problem of these defense-related industries is
that they are unevenly distributed among industries, occupations and regions.
Three separate industries, representing only 4% of total US industry,
accounted for almost 1/3 of all defense-generated employment. Approximately
three out of every five aeronautical engineers, two out of every five air-
plane mechanics, and two out of every five physicists in the United States
were dependent on military expenditures for their livelihood. Additionally,
the percentage of defense-related jobs were much higher in several states,
93
counties and communities than the percentage for the country as a whole.
A reduction in the US troop commitment to Europe might then appreciably
affect defense-related industries. Possible job lay-offs and redistribution
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could result. Assuming those forces returned to the United States were
deactivated, not only could these laid-off industrial laborers enter the
job market, but as well, the 150,000 individuals released from the services.
The effect of such a manpower surge into the labor market would likely be
considerable.
By enacting the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 into law, the present
Administration has initiated a public service employment program in an
94
attempt to partially alleviate the existing unemployment problem.
This law, signed on August 9, 1971, began a two year program of establishing
government subsidized jobs. The $2.25 billion allotted by Congress ($1
billion was allotted for the first year) was quickly absorbed by the 140,000
or so positions created. This still left nearly 5 million persons unemployed
in the US. Were these additional industrial workers and servicemen to join
the ranks of the unemployed, all initial improvements of the program would
be negated. Additionally, any anticipated budgetary savings from the troop
reduction would likely be incorporated into the increased government ex-
penditures necessary to finance an adequate public works program. Were the
government subsidized program discontinued, the seriousness of the unemploy-
ment situation would only be compounded. It seems apparent then that any
troop reduction would be impractical due to the possibilities of increasing
the already serious unemployment problem within the United States.
While accomplishing the same financial goal as mentioned earlier, one
possible solution to easing the tension that exists over US troop reductions
might be to increase the coordination and integration among the NATO allies.
Since NATO is an alliance of different countries, each responsible for
94
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equipping and supplying its armed forces, there is a considerable amount
of duplication in procurement and supply techniques. As a result, exces-
sive wastes occur and there is an inefficient utilization of money and
resources. Closer cooperation and integration might possibly reduce these
costs. Unfortunately, however, it is the United States who refuses to
enter into arrangements that would make the US military forces in Europe
dependent upon a NATO supply system. Were the US to alter its policy and
allow a NATO supervised super-supply network to be established, con-
95
siderable saving would undoubtedly result. It is noted, however, that,
although US defense expenditures may be reduced, these savings would not
be a result of US troop reductions.
Military Consequences
The majority of issues concerning military consequences was previously
discussed in detail (see Military Consequences - Europe). Factors felt
peculiar to the United States are now covered.
With the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine and its low profile
approach to US military commitments throughout the world, a noticeable
effect is being witnessed within the US military services—wages are being
increased and are more closely approximating those received by civilian
contemporaries, living conditions are being improved, and personal liberties
are being expanded. A possible reduction of US troops from Europe would
fit quite nicely into President Nixon's new strategy of "realistic
deterrence," however, their return would not appreciably affect the overall
budgetary considerations of the Administration. The savings that would
95





result by reducing troop levels would be absorbed by the qualitative
96 'improvements being experienced within the military. Additionally, that
potentially fearful credibility gap in the US military force commitment to
Europe would still be created.
Political Consequences
Although it is felt that no actual political repercussions would be
experienced as a result of a US troop reduction, it is significant to
analyze the political pressures which are being exerted and their possible
consequences.
As 1972 is a Presidential election year, President Nixon must remain
aware of the possible repercussions of an angry or hostile Congress, and
nation. Although the Mansfield resolution has repeatedly been defeated,
President Nixon's low profile approach to foreign policy appears to be in
agreement with the gathering support for what Mansfield has been advocating
for several years— a reduction in American foreign military commitments. If
the US is successful in its "Vietnamization" of the conflict in Southeast
Asia, pressures may compel the President to initiate a similar action with
regard to the defense of Europe. After all, it would seem that the Nixon
Doctrine of "helping others help themselves" is more applicable to Europe.
It is economically wealthier, politically more stable and considerably less
volatile than Southeast Asia.
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As the Constitution specifically delineates foreign policy responsi-
bilities to the executive branch of the government, the only direct
influence Congress has upon Presidential foreign policy decisions is through
the appropriations he must have in order to adequately pursue his policies.
Were he not to receive the necessary appropriations, the President would be
forced to alter his objectives. This might be interpreted as if the President
were relinquishing to Congressional demands. The President can not allow him-
self to be pressured into what might appear as Congressional dictation of
American foreign policy. The possibility of this misinterpretation might be
the most devastating of any unilateral troop reduction consequence.
As was clearly demonstrated in the discussion of Military Consequences
—
Europe, once US troops were withdrawn from Europe it could be hypothesized
that the credibility of the NATO conventional forces would become suspect.
Once this hypothesis is accepted, reliance upon nuclear weapons as the only
remaining credible deterrent would increase. As the President is the ultimate
authority on decisions concerning nuclear weapons deployment, additional
pressures would be exerted upon him as fewer alternatives would be available
for action. Apparently convinced that nuclear weapons would be the subsequent
step following a US troop reduction, Senator Brock reminded his colleagues of
the reason why the US troops were stationed in Europe.
The reason we have troops in Europe is to avoid the use of
nuclear weapons, not to use them.
He further challenged the advocates of troop reductions when he asked:
What Senator would be willing to pus
the first nuclear weapon?
h the first button on
P<
Fortunately for themselves, and the nation, the Senators are not delegated
that responsibility— it lies with the President. Certainly their inputs
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influence any decision the President makes, but, the actual decision to
"push the first button" lies with the President. This is precisely the
pressure which may be applied to the President were a troop reduction to
occur and the conventional credibility of NATO's forces sufficiently
weakened.
The final decision of when and if US troops are reduced also is the
ultimate responsibility of the President. Once again, he must be able to
withstand the various pressures that will be exerted upon him for the level
from which, and the manner in which, troop reductions might possibly be made.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CONSIDERATIONS
Common to both continents, but only briefly mentioned in the respective
economic discussions, is the possibility of an economic trade dispute develop-
ing as a result of an American reduction. Accompanying the apparent growth
of protectionist sentiments within the United States, several legislative
bills have been introduced in Congress which have been designed to restrict
imports or to revise tariff schedules on a variety of goods. Bootwear,
textiles, electronic articles, dairy products, iron and steel products and
meats have been most frequently mentioned. On July 20, 1970, despite a
statement by President Nixon that he would veto any legislation setting
mandatory quotas on any imports except textiles, the Ways and Means Committee,
by a vote of 17 to 7, presented to the House of Representatives a bill
(H.R. 18970) which, in addition to other provisions, would fix temporary
98import limits on the quantity of footwear as well as textile. Although
this proposed legislation died in the Senate finance committee, it
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represented a newly protective American attitude. Spurred by this
American attitude, the entire position of world trade appears to have be-
come slightly more protectionist. With international trade relations
tenuous, any US unilateral troop reduction might be interpreted as a
definite sign of a. US return to isolationism. Should that occur, economic
ties might become even more strained.

CONCLUSIONS
As this study had attempted to illustrate, the possible repercussions
of a US unilateral troop reduction are many and varied, both for Europe and
the United States. Although any final decision on troop reductions must
originate from the President, it is paramount that Congressional and world
leaders alike by fully aware of the possible consequences of such an action.
Economic conditions throughout Western Europe and the United States might
deteriorate. Ceneral American credibility, both politically and militarily,
could be adversely affected. Europe's entire defense structure might falter
and the North Atlantic Alliance possibly unravel. The Soviet Union and its
allies, witnessing a weakening in the Western defense posture, might initiate
aggressive action in an attempt to achieve their ideological conquest of
domination. Mutual balance force reductions, continuing strategic arms
limitations talks, and West Germany's "Ostpolitik" may be terminated as a
result of a precipitate US action. Additionally, a dramatic world re-
orientation might occur with the West leaning East in search of economically-
oriented ties.
It would appear from this analysis that any positive agreement for US
troop reductions reached by the United States would place the West at a dis-
advantage. State Department, as well as Defense Department officials
concurred with this belief in a January 31, 1972,' New York Times article.
They further added that nothing short of unexpected Soviet concessions could
reduce the likelihood of yielding a substantial advantage to the communist
99bloc if such an American action were taken. As Christopher Bertram stated
in a 1970 issue of World Todav:






Detente will, for a long time to come, continue to be
characterized by the simultaneous existence of antagonism
and cooperation. bast and West will be partners and
adversaries at the same time. The problem facing any
Western government is how to reduce antagonisms without
prejudicing security and how to increase cooperation with-
inn
out jeopardizing stability in Eastern Europe. uu
Until the Soviet Union clearly demonstrates a desire for peace and a
willingness to reduce its military strength, it is felt the United States
would be foolish to voluntarily reduce its own defense efforts. With the
immediate Soviet military threat and superiority as it is, it would appear
that, rather than a reduction, an urgent requirement for additional front-
line conventional forces exists. As well, a need for more standardization,
integration and cooperation in the areas of logistics is apparent.
NATO has two principal purposes: to provide the sense of security that
is required for Western Europe's gradual movement toward greater unity, and
tc provide the stable platform on which East-West relaxation of tension is
101
based. Neither has apparently been fully achieved and neither can hope to
be achieved without full and visible US involvement in Western European
affairs. Europe is unable to replace the American presence. Even if the
NATO allies were willing and able to put a European soldier in place of every
American G.I. withdrawn, it could not make up for the deterrent effect in-
» •
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herent in American troops.
If the United States Administration feels it is absolutely necessary
to reduce its personnel in Europe, it is hoped that the plans will be long-
term, and publicly announced. At least this would allow the NATO and
European leaders some time to re-deploy their forces and determine ways of
100 „Bertram, op. cit .
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replacing the diminished fire-power created by the US withdrawal. A
reduction evenly spread over several years might also do little damage to
either the symbolic commitment of the United States or to its effective con-
ventional contribution. Contrarily, a sudden, arbitrary withdrawal of
American forces might affect, not only the conventional credibility of the
Western alliance's forces, but, as well, the credibility of the US tactical
nuclear guarantee.
As President Nixon is presently witnessing in Southeast Asia, one can
not effectively negotiate peaceful settlements from a position of weakness.
Were the US to unilaterally initiate troop reductions from Western Europe,
as they have done from Southeast Asia (not merely from Vietnam, but as well
Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Phillipines) , its position of negotiating
strength might be weakened. This belief is apparently strengthened by Mr.
Henry M. V. Buntinx who warned in his article "Symmetrical Force Reductions
Versus European Collective Security":
...those who want the NATO forces to initiate the first stage
in troop reductions . . . are competing among themselves for the
Nobel Prize for Naivety . 103
One wonders then, what justification there is for the increasing pres-
sures within the United States for a troop reduction from Western Europe and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?
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The Mansfield Amendment H.R. 6531,
A Bill to Amend the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967
(Portions thereof)
TITLE IV Reduction of US Military Forces in Europe
Section 401
a) The Congress hereby finds that the number of US military
personnel stationed in Europe can be significantly reduced
without endangering the security of Western Europe, and
that such a reduction would have a favorable effect on
this nation's balance-of-payments problem and would help
avoid recurring international monetary crises involving
the value of the dollar abroad. It is therefore the
purpose of this section to provide for such a reduction
at the earliest practicable date.
b) No funds appropriated by Congress may be used after
December 31, 1971, for the purpose of supporting or main-
taining in Europe any military personnel of the US in
excess of 150,000.
U.S., Congress, Congressional Record
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Text of the Treaty on the Renunciation
of Force Between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Soviet Union,
signed at Moscow on 12 August 1970
(Portions thereof)
Article 1
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics consider it an important objective of their policies to maintain
international peace and achieve detente.
They affirm their endeavor to further the normalization of the situa-
tion in Europe and the development of peaceful relations among all European
states, and in doing so proceed from the actual situation existing in this
region.
Article 2
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics shall in their mutual relations as well as in matters of ensuring
European and international security be guided by the purposes and principles
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly they shall settle
their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake to refrain from
the threat or use of force, pursuant to Article 2 of the Charter of the
United Nations, in any matters affecting security in Europe or international
security, as well as in their mutual relations.
Article 3
In accordance with the foregoing purposes and principles the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics share the
realization that peace can only be maintained in Europe if nobody disturbs
the present frontiers.
They undertake to respect without restriction the territorial integrity
of all states in Europe within their present frontiers.
They declare that they have no territorial claims against anybody nor
will assert such claims in the future.
They regard today and shall in the future regard the frontiers of all





Text of the Draft Treaty
Proposed by the GDR included in a Letter
from Herr Ulbricht to President Heinemann
of the Federal Republic of Germany
on 13 December 1969
(Portions thereof)
After exchanging their authorizations in an appropriate and seemly form,
they have reached agreement on the following points:
Article 1
The parties to the treaty agree to the establishment of normal equal
relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic
of Germany, free of any discrimination and on the basis of generally
recognized principles and norms of international law. Their mutual rela-
tions are based in particular on the principles of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity, inviolability of state frontiers, non-interference
in internal and mutual advantage.
Article 2
The parties to the treaty mutually recognize their present territorial
holding within the existing borders and the inviolability thereof. They
recognize those borders in Europe fixed by the result of World War II be-
tween the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany as
well as the frontier on the Oder and Neisse between the German Democratic
Republic and the People's Republic of Poland.
Article 3
The parties to the treaty pledge to renounce the threat and use of
force in their mutual relationship and to solve all disputes between them-
selves in a peaceful way and by peaceful means.
Article 4
The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany
renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons or the disposal of the same in
any way.
Article 5
The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany
are establishing diplomtic relations.
Appendix II and Appendix III were taken in part from:
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sixteenth Meet-
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Partial Text of Franco-Soviet
Declaration of October, 1970
The two parties consider that detente in Europe should be furthered by
the holding of a properly prepared European Conference, which would facili-
tate the development of close relations and which would mark the beginning
of permanent cooperation between all interested states, outside the framework
of bloc politics. They consider that such a conference should have as its
aim the reinforcement of European security through the creation of a system
of undertakings that would exclude any recourse to the threat or the use of
force in relations between European states and that would ensure the respect
for the principles of the territorial integrity of states, of non-interference
in their international affairs, and of the equality and independence of all
states. The two parties declare themsevles to be in favor of the idea of a
European conference...
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sixteenth Meeting of
the North Atlantic Assembly, Report of the United State s Delegation to the
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